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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
- vs 
STEVEN DIETER BUGYIK, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 981499 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for a third 
degree felony in a criminal case. The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the initial stop of Appellant's car 
was supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion of the 
commission of a crime. The trial court's decision whether 
the facts of a particular case give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
2. If the initial stop was justified at its 
1 
inception, whether the ensuing detention was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which initially 
justified the stop. This is a question of law, and the 
trial court's decision is reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); see State v. Lopez, 
873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). 
3. Whether the warrantless, unconsented search of 
the trunk of Appellant's car was supported by probable 
cause. The determination of probable cause is a question of 
law the trial court's determination of which is reviewed for 
correctness. The trial court's underlying factual findings 
are examined for clear error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 
(Utah 1994). 
The foregoing issues were preserved in the trial 
court in Appellant's Memorandum in support of his motion to 
suppress (R 60,65,72). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation and 
particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature, Course and Disposition Below 
Appellant was charged with possession of marijuana 
with intent to distribute, in violation of U.C.A. §58-37-
8(1)(a)(I), and with failure to pay drug stamp tax, in 
violation of U.C.A. §59-19-106, both third degree felonies 
(R 1). After the trial court denied a Motion to Suppress (R 
92), Appellant entered a conditional plea of no contest to 
the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute (R 114), preserving his right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress (R 121). 
Statement of Facts1 
Trooper Haycock stopped Bugyik's car on 1-70 
around 3:00 p.m. March 6, 1997. The weather was clear and 
warm (T 39). Haycock says he stopped the car for no 
registration, because when the car drove by Haycock's 
stationary position he saw no license plates on it. Bugyik 
stopped and Haycock stopped behind him; Bugyik got out of 
his car (T 4). According to Haycock, Bugyik was wearing a 
t-shirt, shorts and no shoes, and he looked "scared." He 
1
 The suppression hearing transcript (R 147)is not 
separately paginated. Accordingly, all citations herein to that 
transcript are designated with "T" and the appropriate page in 
that transcript. 
3 
asked Haycock why he had been stopped and Haycock told him 
"for no registration/' Bugyik told him the car was a 
rental, and that there should be a rental agreement. 
Haycock moved up "right by" the trunk of Bugyik's car and 
saw what he "thought might be a temporary sticker pasted in 
the back window." On closer examination Haycock determined 
that the sticker was a valid 90-day Arizona temporary permit 
(T 5) . 
While Haycock was looking at the temporary 
registration sticker, Bugyik explained that he had a medical 
emergency in Denver and that a Dr. Dean Allen had rented the 
car for him (T 24). 
Trooper Haycock says that after seeing that the 
temporary sticker was valid, he was "preparing just to 
depart and leave," (T 5) but never told Bugyik that he had 
determined that the car was properly registered (T 42-43), 
nor that Bugyik was at that point free to leave (T 23-23). 
The record is unclear whether Haycock, at the time he was 
"preparing just to depart and leave," turned around toward 
his patrol car; Haycock conspicuously avoided affirmatively 
responding to two direct questions whether he ever actually 
turned around to leave (T 43). 
4 
Before Haycock did anything to let Bugyik know 
that he was satisfied that the registration was valid, 
Bugyik asked Haycock if he wanted to see the lease 
agreement. Haycock responded, "Sure, I'd like to see that, 
if you don't mind"(T 6). Bugyik immediately retrieved a 
Hertz envelope from the interior of the car and gave it to 
Haycock (T 7). 
Haycock examined the rental agreement and noticed 
that the renter was Dean Porter, and did not list Bugyik as 
a driver. He then asked Bugyik for a driver's license (T 8, 
29), and Bugyik "started explaining about his Arizona 
drivers license" in a manner characterized by Haycock as 
"gibberish" (T 7). Bugyik returned to the inside of the car 
and retrieved an Arizona license that was punched, 
indicating to Haycock that the license was not valid (T 
8,30). 
Haycock testified that by the time Bugyik produced 
the driver's license, Bugyik's fear and confusion had 
escalated, and that his behavior caused Haycock to fear for 
his own safety (T 9), although Haycock never performed a 
Terry pat down for weapons (T 17,36). 
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While Bugyik had been retrieving the driver's 
license, the trooper noted the following (T 9): 
1. An open Colorado road map on the front seat of 
the car; 
2. That there were a lot of keys and 
advertisements on the ignition key ring; 
3. A Day's Inn envelope in the luggage in the 
back seat; 
4. A pizza box and Coke cans in the car; 
5. That the passenger window was partly rolled 
down; 
6. Bugyik was to Haycock's mind more nervous that 
other people in a similar situation; 
7. The rental agreement was not in Bugyik's name 
and Bugyik was not named as a second driver; and 
8. A Las Vegas Line magazine, which Haycock 
apparently recognized as a complimentary motel publication. 
Trooper Haycock then asked Bugyik how much 
marijuana was in the car (T 9, 10). Bugyik said that there 
was none. Haycock asked him what was in the trunk, and 
Bugyik told him that there was nothing in the trunk, but 
that Haycock could not look in it. Although Haycock then 
6 
confronted him with the familiar "nothing to hide" 
challenge, Bugyik still refused to permit him to search the 
trunk. During this exchange, Bugyik also said that he had 
not "been in the trunk," which Haycock considered to be 
inconsistent with Bugyik's statement that there was nothing 
in the trunk (T 10). 
After Haycock's accusation and Bugyik's denial 
about marijuana, Haycock searched the interior of the car 
for weapons (T 10), putting his head and shoulders inside 
the car while kneeling on the driver's side seat or the 
floor (T 18). He looked under the road map, under the front 
seat (T 17), and into the back seat area (T 18), determining 
that there were no weapons in the car.2 
Trooper Haycock testified that while he was 
inside the car searching for weapons, he detected a "strong 
odor of coffee," (T 10) and a "very weak odor of marijuana" 
(T 11). An experienced officer in drug interdiction, 
Haycock said that some people who are trying to hide 
something with a strong odor use "coffee grounds" and "other 
2
 Haycock first said that he made this search for weapons 
in the vicinity of where Bugyik was seated in the vehicle (T 10) . 
Later, Haycock said that during this weapons search, Bugyik was 
"standing at the front right of the car by the door/' (T 18). 
Almost immediately, Haycock changed Bugyik's location during the 
weapons search to the left, or driver's side of the car (T 19). 
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things'' for that purpose (T 11, 12) . After smelling the 
coffee odor and the "weak odor of marijuana," he removed the 
keys from the ignition and opened the trunk of the car, 
where he found two duffle bags. He bent over, smelled the 
duffel bags, and detected a "strong odor of marijuana" (T 
10). He subsequently discovered that the duffle bags 
contained nine bundles of marijuana weighing 65 pounds (T 
12). The marijuana was wrapped in sheets of fabric 
softener(T 34) which Haycock said smelled like coffee, and 
which was the identical odor he had detected during his 
search of the interior of the car for weapons (T 44). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: The stop of Appellant's car was not 
justified at its inception by a reasonable articulable 
suspicion of crime. When he failed to see the car's 
temporary registration sticker, which was valid and properly 
displayed in the rear window of the car, the officer stopped 
the car immediately without making any effort to dispel his 
suspicion of improper registration by overtaking the car and 
observing from a closer distance whether it bore a temporary 
sticker. The officer's failure to employ this less 
intrusive means of investigation rendered his continued 
8 
suspicion an unreasonable basis for making a level two 
seizure. 
POINT II; If the initial stop was justified, the 
ensuing detention exceeded its permissible scope. Having 
determined that Appellant's car bore a valid temporary 
registration sticker which was lawfully displayed, the 
officer did not so inform Appellant, and nothing in the 
circumstances made it clear to Appellant that he was free to 
go. Although there existed an available means for the 
officer promptly to confirm or dispel his suspicion that the 
car might be stolen, the officer did not employ that means, 
but instead remained and continued to gather information 
relating to his suspicion that Appellant was a drug courier. 
POINT III: The warrantless, unconsented search of 
the trunk of Appellant's car was not supported by probable 
cause. The officer's search of the car interior was not in 
fact a search for weapons and was not within the weapons 
exception to the warrant requirement. The odors which the 
officer claimed to have detected while searching the car 
interior cannot be considered in the probable cause 
determination because the officer expressly did not consider 
the odors before concluding that the trunk contained 
9 
marijuana, and because the evidence regarding the odors is 
vague, irrelevant and unbelievable. The remaining facts 
from which the officer says he developed probable cause for 
the trunk search are not an adequate basis for probable 
cause to believe the trunk contained drugs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: HAYCOCK'S INITIAL STOP OF BUGYIK' S 
CAR WAS NOT JUSTIFIED AT ITS INCEPTION 
BECAUSE THE TROOPER DID NOT EMPLOY AN 
AVAILABLE, LESS INTRUSIVE MEANS TO CONFIRM 
OR DISPEL HIS SUSPICION. 
Stopping a car and detaining its occupants 
constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648 (1979). In order to be reasonable, the initial 
stop must be justified, and the officer's subsequent actions 
must be within the scope of the circumstances justifying the 
stop. City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165 (Utah App. 
1997). Unless the stop was initially justified, and the 
subsequent inquiry limited in scope to the purpose that 
justified it, any evidence gathered during the ensuing 
investigation at the scene is not admissible, regardless 
whether the warrantless search producing the evidence was 
otherwise lawful. State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah 
1990) . 
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It is the prosecutor's burden to justify the 
warrantless search of this car, and the inquiry begins with 
whether the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion 
that Bugyik had committed, or was about to commit a crime. 
State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996). Trooper Haycock 
said that he did not see any license plates on Bugyik's car 
as the car went by his stationary position (T 4). By 
implication, he also did not see the temporary registration 
sticker when he began pursuit of Bugyik's car, because he 
said that when he pulled in behind Bugyik's car he "didn't 
see it either'" (T 47). The trial court ruled that because 
the trooper "could see no license plate nor temporary 
registration sticker as he approached the vehicle from 
behind, he had a reasonable suspicion" that Bugyik was 
driving a car without registration (R 92).3 
In State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) a police officer, having noticed that an oncoming car 
had no license plates, turned around and overtook the car to 
see if he could see a temporary sticker. Although he could 
see a paper in the lower right corner of the car's rear 
window, he could not tell what the paper was because of the 
3
 The trial court's written ruling on the Motion to 
Suppress is reproduced in the Addendum, infra p. 46. 
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slant of the window. While he was following the car, the 
driver turned off the freeway and onto an infrequently used 
dirt road. Considering this to be "possibly evasive 
behavior/' the officer activated his overhead lights and 
stopped the car. This Court held that the stop was proper. 
In this case, Haycock made no attempt to overtake 
Bugyik's car to determine if it was properly stickered, and 
Bugyik had done nothing unlawful or evasive prior to the 
stop. It is settled law that, once a stop has been made, 
police officers must diligently pursue a means of 
investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
1994). In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that 
after an otherwise justifiable stop is made, "the 
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive 
means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's 
suspicion in a short period of time." Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
Although defense counsel has found no Utah case 
specifically requiring that an officer diligently pursue by 
the least intrusive available means a course promptly to 
confirm or dispel suspicion before the stop is made, this 
12 
Court is urged so to hold, at least in cases involving 
temporary registration stickers. Important public policy is 
involved. This is because the situation presents a very 
high potential for police abuse, and because unless such a 
limitation is imposed, virtually any car with a temporary 
sticker might be stopped on the premise that the officer 
didn't clearly see the sticker.4 Absent additional facts 
contributing to suspicion (such as the evasive action taken 
by the driver in Naisbitt, supra), it is reasonable to 
require that an officer, before making a level two seizure, 
first attempt to overtake a vehicle in order to look from a 
closer vantage point for a sticker the officer was unable to 
see at a distance. Because this encounter occurred during 
daylight at a time when Bugyik was driving in a lawful 
manner, it is reasonable to expect that Haycock would have 
been able to see the temporary sticker merely by driving 
closer to the car without having to stop it. 
4
 The trooper in this case, a veteran and a teacher of drug 
interdiction, patrolling a highway he believes to be a major 
route of drug couriers, acknowledged that he "probably" has in 
the past arrested drug couriers that he initially stopped because 
he saw no license plate on a car that bore a valid temporary 
registration sticker (T 46). He also is aware that other 
officers in his area have made drug courier arrests in identical 
circumstances. 
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POINT II: EVEN IF THE INITIAL STOP WAS 
JUSTIFIED, THE ENSUING DETENTION WAS NOT 
REASONABLY RELATED IN SCOPE TO THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH JUSTIFIED THE STOP IN 
THE FIRST INSTANCE 
After he stopped Bugyik's car, Haycock's detention 
went beyond the limitation that it be reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which initially justified the stop. 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
1. This incident never became a level-
one voluntary encounter. 
Unless Haycock's examination of the rental 
agreement came about as Bugyik's voluntary act at a time 
after the encounter went from a level-two seizure to a 
level-one police/citizen voluntary encounter, Haycock 
exceeded the permissible scope of any inquiry that may have 
justified the initial stop/seizure. 
Once a person is seized for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, the seizure does not 
cease simply because the police formulate 
an uncommunicated intention that the 
seized person may go about his or her 
way. For the seizure to end, it must be 
clear to the seized person, either from 
the words of the officer or from the 
clear import of the circumstances, that 
the person is at liberty to go about his 
or her business. State v. Higgins, 884 
P.2d 1242(Utah 1994)(c i ta t ion omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
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After Haycock examined the temporary sticker in 
Bugyik's rear window and found it to be valid, he never 
communicated that fact to Bugyik, nor did he tell Bugyik 
that he could go. The trial court made a finding that after 
the officer saw the valid sticker on Bugyik's car, he "noted 
that his concern had been allayed, and turned to leave" (R 
93). No evidence whatever exists in this record that 
Haycock "noted that his concern had been allayed" unless 
this statement by the trial court is interpreted to mean 
that Haycock noted this to himself, in which event Bugyik 
could not have known it. If, on the other hand, this 
statement is the trial court's expression of a finding of 
fact that Haycock communicated to Bugyik his satisfaction 
that the car was properly registered, then the finding is 
clearly erroneous. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 
1994). 
In addition, the trial judge's statement that 
Haycock "turned to leave" is a fact which Haycock himself 
did not clearly embrace when he conspicuously avoided two 
direct questions about it at the suppression hearing (T 43). 
Nonetheless, whether Haycock turned toward his car or not, 
nothing had taken place to make it clear to Bugyik that he 
15 
was free to go prior to Haycock's examination of the rental 
agreement. He had told Bugyik that he stopped him "for no 
registration" (T 5), and had, in Bugyik's presence, taken a 
close look at the sticker in the window. Yet he said 
nothing to Bugyik. In these circumstances, it is not only 
reasonable, but likely, that a person in Bugyik's position 
would think that the officer's close inspection of the 
sticker had led the officer to the conclusion that the 
sticker was not a proper registration5, and that the officer 
was going to his car to radio the dispatcher for a 
registration check, to request backup, to retrieve a 
citation book or a list of stolen cars, or for some other 
purpose related to continuing his investigation. If it did 
occur, Haycock's turning to leave cannot be said clearly to 
communicate Bugyik's freedom to go on his way. 
This case is distinguishable from State v. 
Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 (Utah App. 1996), where this Court 
held that the trial judge's fact finding that the defendant 
5
 That Bugyik in fact had so interpreted Haycock's silence, 
and believed it was necessary to furnish Haycock some additional 
proof that the car was not stolen, provides a significantly more 
rational explanation why a person in Bugyik's precarious position 
would be doing anything at all to prolong the encounter than the 
trial court's suggestion that Bugyik "invited continued police 
attention" because he concluded that it might be helpful to 
appear "exceptionally cooperative." (R 94) 
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acted of his own free will in undertaking at the scene of 
the stop to repair a defective light which gave rise to the 
stop was not against the clear weight of the evidence. In 
Patefield, the officer had initially made a valid stop for 
an actual violation, and had issued a ''verbal warning" to 
the defendant. Upon the incomplete record of the evidence in 
that case,6 where defense counsel appears to have conceded 
at the suppression hearing that the officer meant only to 
issue a "verbal warning" rather than to require immediate 
repair of the defective light on the spot, the trial judge 
found as a fact that the defendant voluntarily undertook to 
fix the light, and concluded that he thereby voluntarily 
converted the stop to a level-one encounter. 
Unlike the Patefield record7, the evidence in this 
case is clear that the officer said nothing to Bugyik about 
his freedom to leave. The portion of the Patefield opinion 
dealing with the level-two/level-one issue appears, then, 
to have been more a review (under a "clearly erroneous" 
6
 "No testimony was given to clarify whether Eldredge 
returned Patefield's driver's license or told Patefield that he 
was free to leave before Patefield offered to repair the light." 
927 P.2d at 656. 
7
 " . . . the record is less than precise as to exactly what 
was said during the exchange between Eldredge and Patefield . . 
927 P.2d at 659. 
17 
standard) of the trial court's findings of fact in a case 
where the evidentiary record was incomplete, unclear and 
ambiguous, than a review for correctness of the trial 
court's legal conclusions. Here, there is no possibility, 
as there was in Patefield, that the officer had returned a 
drivers' license, symbolic of the termination of police 
inquiry, and of the person's freedom thereafter to leave. 
It was never the clear import of the circumstances in this 
case that Bugyik was free to leave, nor did Haycock ever 
tell him so. 
Haycock acknowledged that in order for him to 
effect the stop, it was not necessary for him to see the 
rental agreement (T 21). Since the encounter had not 
changed from a level two seizure to a level one citizen-
police exchange in which Bugyik actually volunteered the 
rental agreement, Haycock's examination of the agreement 
exceeded the permissible scope of his investigation because 
it was not necessary to the determination whether the car 
had a valid registration sticker. 
2. Even if the stop had become a level-one 
encounter when Haycock saw the rental 
agreement, it then returned to level-two 
status, and Haycock's ensuing investigation 
exceeded its permissible scope. 
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If, contrary to the foregoing analysis, the 
initial stop had become a level-one consensual encounter 
which was extended by Bugyik's offer to show Haycock the 
rental agreement, the encounter returned to level-two status 
when Haycock noticed the discrepancies between the contract 
and what Bugyik had told him. Haycock said that at this 
point he considered that the car might be stolen, and that 
Bugyik was not free to go (T 27). 
If reasonable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity does arise, the scope 
of the stop is still limited. The 
officers must diligently pursue a means 
of investigation that is likely to 
confirm or dispel their suspicions 
quickly, during which time it is 
necessary to detain the defendant. 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 
1994), at 1131 {citations omitted). 
Did Haycock pursue the least intrusive means 
available to him quickly to confirm or dispel his suspicion 
that the car was stolen? He did not: 
Q: If after you determined that the 
rental agreement did not show Mr. Bugyik 
as an authorized driver, is there 
anything that you could have done that 
would have dispelled your suspicion that 
the car was stolen so that you would have 
let him go on his way if nothing else had 
happened? 
A: Yes, sir. 
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Q: What would that have been? 
A: Calling Hertz on the telephone and 
asking them if they had listed him in 
some way. (T 27-28) 
Instead of pursuing this means, however, Haycock 
remained with Bugyik, asking to see his driver's license (T 
7), and making numerous, detailed observations about the 
interior of the car while Bugyik was looking for the drivers 
license.8 In so doing, Haycock exceeded the scope of the 
inquiry into his suspicion that the car was stolen. 
Although Haycock says that by the time he got a look at the 
rental agreement, he had observed facts and drawn inferences 
that led him to*suspect Bugyik was a drug courier, the 
inference was not reasonable. Those facts are no more 
consistent with crime than with an innocent explanation,9 
and they would not lead a reasonable person, even one who 
possessed Haycock's expert knowledge about the use of 1-70 
8
 Haycock says that while Bugyik was looking for the 
drivers license, he saw a Colorado road map on the passenger 
seat, numerous keys and advertisements on the ignition key ring, 
a Day's Inn envelope, luggage in the back seat (instead of in the 
trunk), a Domino's Pizza box and Cherry Coke cans, a partially 
rolled down window, and a Las Vegas Line magazine. (T 9) 
9
 ". . . these circumstances ^describe a very large 
category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject 
to virtually random seizures were [we] to conclude that as little 
foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure.'" 
State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1997). Citing Reid v. 
Georgia, 446 U.S. 438, 441 (1980). 
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and rental cars by drug couriers, to suspect that Bugyik was 
carrying illegal drugs. See State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 
(Utah App. 1992); State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 
1987). At this point in the encounter, therefore, Haycock's 
inquiry was limited in scope to determining whether the car 
was stolen, and he did not pursue a reasonable and available 
means to minimize the encounter and resolve the question. 
POINT III: THE WARRANTLESS, UNCONSENTED 
SEARCH OF BUGYIK' S TRUNK WAS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY PROBABLE CAUSE 
Because Haycock searched the trunk of Bugyik's 
car without Bugyik's consent and without a warrant, it is 
the State's burden to establish that the search was 
reasonable. State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386 (Utah App. 1996), 
aff'd, 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997). The warrantless search of 
an automobile requires both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances.10 State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 
1996). 
10
 It is conceded that under the present state of the law in 
Utah, "exigent circumstances'7 will exist in virtually every 
highway stop, State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1996), 
so Appellant does not rely on the absence of exigent 
circumstances. 
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1. Haycock's search of the car interior 
was not within the weapons exception to 
the warrant requirement. 
According to Haycock's testimony at the 
suppression hearing, Bugyik eventually found and gave him an 
Arizona driver's license that had been punched, indicating 
that it had been suspended. Haycock says that by this time 
Bugyik's apparent fear and agitation had continued to 
escalate, making Haycock fear for his own safety (T 9). The 
trooper did not, however, immediately act on that fear by 
patting Bugyik down11 or by looking for weapons inside the 
car; rather, he asked Bugyik how much marijuana there was in 
the trunk, (T 9,10), eliciting from him a denial, a refusal 
to consent to a search of the trunk, and an additional 
suspicious inconsistency (T 10). It was not until after all 
this that Haycock got inside the car to look, according to 
him, for weapons. 
Was Haycock's search of the car interior for 
weapons justified? 
11
 Prior to the formal arrest, Haycock never did search 
Bugyik's person for weapons. He testified that because Bugyik 
was wearing shorts, no shoes and a very tight T-shirt, there was 
not in his mind any substantial concern that Bugyik was 
concealing a weapon on his person (T 21, 36). 
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(T)he search of the passenger compartment 
of an automobile, limited to those areas 
in which a weapon may be placed or 
hidden, is permissible if the police 
officer possesses a reasonable belief 
based on "specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant" the officer in believing that 
the suspect is dangerous and the suspect 
may gain immediate control of weapons. 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 
(1983) Citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968) at 21. (emphasis added) 
This "weapons exception" is established in Utah. 
In State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1992), an 
officer had made a valid speeding stop. During the ensuing 
colloquy with the driver about his license and registration, 
the officer saw a rifle in the hatchback of the car. The 
driver said the gun was not loaded. The officer noticed 
that he appeared "shaky," and thought he might be under the 
influence of drugs. The officer did not immediately check 
the gun. He was in his vehicle running the driver's license 
check when he saw the driver move a black bag toward himself 
from the hatchback of his car. The officer said that at 
this point he became concerned for his safety, fearing that 
the driver might be reaching for another weapon. He 
discontinued the license and registration checks, called for 
backup, and immediately approached the car to follow up on 
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his concern. He saw the black bag behind the driver's seat 
under some garbage. He asked the driver whether he had any 
other firearms in the car and the driver said he did not. 
The officer directed the driver to get out of the car and 
stand on the passenger side, then searched the interior of 
the car. When he came upon the black bag he opened it, 
later stating that he did so because he wanted to see if it 
contained a gun. There was no gun in the bag, but it 
contained illegal drugs and paraphernalia. The Court of 
Appeals approved the search of the bag, holding that it was 
within the "weapons exception'' established in Michigan v. 
Long: 
When an officer reasonably believes a 
suspect is dangerous and may obtain 
immediate control of weapons, a 
protective search is justified. . . . An 
officer may conduct a protective weapons 
search only if "a reasonably prudent 
[person] in the circumstances would be 
warranted in the belief that his [or her] 
safety or that of others was in danger. . 
Furthermore, the fact, taken in 
isolation, that a suspect is outside a 
vehicle while an officer is conducting a 
search does not overcome an officer's 
reasonable fear because the suspect may 
"break away from police control and 
retrieve a weapon from [the] automobile." 
839 P.2d at 870 {citations omitted). 
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Haycock's search of the interior of Bugyik's car 
cannot be justified under the weapons exception defined in 
Michigan v. Long and Bradford: 
1. No specific facts have ever been articulated 
by Haycock as warranting his belief that Bugyik was 
dangerous and may have gained immediate control of weapons. 
All Haycock says is that he feared for his safety because 
Bugyik's apparent fear had continued to escalate as the 
encounter wore on. In contrast, the officer in Bradford had 
seen one gun in the car and had watched the driver from a 
distance as he pulled the black bag towards himself while 
the officer was absent running a license and registration 
check. These specific facts in Bradford clearly warranted a 
belief that the driver might be dangerous and might be able 
to gain immediate control of a weapon from inside the car or 
from inside the black bag. The present case has no such 
specific facts sufficient reasonably to warrant the 
requisite fear for personal safety which the cases require. 
2. Haycock's testimony that his search of the car 
interior was motivated by his fear for his own safety is not 
borne out by the circumstances. Although he claims to have 
developed this fear by the time Bugyik had produced the 
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suspended Arizona license, Haycock did not at that time 
conduct the search of the car interior. Instead, he posed 
to Bugyik the startling question: "How much marijuana is in 
the trunk?"12 And when Bugyik denied any such knowledge, 
Haycock still did not act on his claim of fear for personal 
safety by searching the interior for weapons. Instead, he 
engaged Bugyik in a dialogue designed to secure his consent 
to a search of the car's trunk, and when Bugyik refused 
consent, Haycock still didn't search for weapons. Rather, 
he made a second attempt, employing the familiar "nothing to 
hide" challenge, to get Bugyik's consent, which was refused 
a second time. It was then that Haycock searched the 
interior of the car. The timing of the claimed search for 
weapons is highly suspect, and although Haycock's subjective 
mind set is not the test, it strongly suggests that he did 
not in fact harbor the fear for personal safety which he 
offers to justify his entry into the car interior. 
12
 If nothing else, the question demonstrates Haycock's 
confidence in a conclusion he had already reached, and which is 
almost certainly his primary motivation and focus from at least 
that point (and probably earlier) on. 
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2. Haycock's warrantless and unconsented 
search of the trunk was not supported by 
probable cause. 
The trial court listed the facts it believed 
sufficient to establish probable cause for Haycock's search 
of the trunk of the car (R 95) :13 
1. Bugyik's one piece of luggage inside the car 
instead of in the trunk. 
2. Bugyik's excessive and escalating fear. 
3. Bugyik wasn't a listed driver on the contract. 
4. Bugyik gave the incorrect surname of the 
renter. 
5. The open road map on the front seat. 
6. Numerous keys on the ignition keyring. 
7. Fast food wrappers inside the car. 
8. Bugyik's claim of travel from Tucson to Denver 
because of a family medical emergency. 
9. The Las Vegas Line magazine and the Day's Inn 
envelope, indicating that the car had been in Las Vegas.14 
13
 Addendum, infra p. 46. 
14
 There is no evidence that Haycock knew which Day's Inn 
had been the source of the envelope at any time before he 
searched the trunk, so the trial court's conclusion in this 
respect is clearly erroneous. 
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10. The proposition that the route Tucson-Las 
Vegas-Denver "would be a very substantial detour, 
particularly for one responding to a family emergency." 
11. The fact that Bugyik's clothing "could not 
conceal much of a weapon." 
12. Bugyik's invalid Arizona driver's license. 
13. The fact that Bugyik was "traveling on a drug 
courier route from an area that exports marijuana to an area 
that imports it."15 
14. That Haycock had smelled a "weak odor of 
marijuana and a strong odor of coffee" inside the car, but 
saw no coffee (R 96). 
15. Bugyik "had stated that he did not know what 
was in the trunk" (R 97). 
Considering first the only alleged facts that are 
even remotely connected to a reasonable suspicion of drug 
transport, the odors which Haycock claims to have smelled 
inside Bugyik's car cannot be considered in the probable 
cause determination in this case. There are at least four 
reasons for this: 
15
 Haycock said that "Tucson is characterized as an export 
city for marijuana as is Las Vegas," that "Denver, Colorado is an 
import city for those products," and "1-70 is a corridor in which 
those drugs are driven and delivered." (T 45). 
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1. Haycock was not lawfully inside the car when he 
claims to have detected the odors because his search of the 
interior was not a legitimate weapons search, supra pp. 14-
18. 
2. The odors were not in fact considered by 
Haycock himself in reaching his conclusion that probable 
cause existed to believe there was marijuana in the trunk of 
this car. An experienced officer and instructor in drug 
interdiction (T 11), Haycock was very specifically 
questioned about his actual probable cause determination in 
this case: 
Q: At some point, I assume, before you 
turned the key in that trunk and found the 
bags of marijuana you had formed in your 
mind what we call probable cause to believe 
that there (were) some drugs in that car, 
is that fair to say: 
A: Yes. 
Q: At what point did that happen? 
A: At the time that I had asked him how 
much marijuana was in the trunk, in the 
car. 
Q: Okay, so by the time you asked him how 
much marijuana was in the car you, at least 
in your mind, had probable cause to believe 
that there was marijuana in the car? 
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A: Yes. (T 40-41) 
Haycock had already testified that he asked Bugyik how much 
marijuana was in the car before he got inside it to look for 
weapons (T 10,11). When defense counsel attempted to elicit 
from him an inconsistency, suggesting that the odors were a 
part of his actual probable cause decision, Haycock did not 
take the bait: 
Q: Okay, so by the time you asked him how 
much marijuana was in the car you, at least 
in your mind, had probable cause to believe 
that there was marijuana in the car? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that was based on what, Trooper? 
A: That was based on the points of 
reasonable suspicion that I addressed in 
this case. 
Q: Including the smell, the map, the 
luggage, all of that? 
A: The map, the keys, the Day's Inn, the 
fast foods, the window rolled down on the 
passenger side, the luggage, the fear, the 
lease agreement, the false name, the Las 
Vegas magazine. 
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3. The trial court's findings relating to the 
existence of these odors are clearly erroneous. Implicit in 
the trial court's finding that Haycock had smelled a strong 
odor of coffee in the passenger compartment of Bugyik's car 
is a finding that the smell Haycock actually perceived was 
the odor to which Haycock had referred in his testimony that 
couriers use the odor of coffee to conceal marijuana.16 
This finding is clearly erroneous. Haycock's own testimony 
in this case was that "I never smelled anything like It/' (T 
34)17 and it is therefore impossible that what he smelled 
was the "coffee" he testified is used to conceal marijuana. 
Since Haycock was smelling something for the first time, and 
since there is no evidence that the odor he smelled is 
something that is used by couriers to conceal drugs, the 
trial court's finding is 
16
 "Haycock had learned that coffee odors can be used to 
mask marijuana odors." (R 97) 
17
 This statement by Haycock is incorrectly punctuated in 
the transcript as a question. 
31 
not supported by the evidence.18 
4. The evidence of the odor of marijuana is vague, 
unreliable and inherently suspicious. The trial court's 
finding (R 97) that there existed a "weak odor of marijuana" 
is clearly erroneous. Haycock, almost as an afterthought 
when he had testified in detail about he "strong odor of 
coffee" he had detected inside Bugyik's car, added that 
"There was also a very weak odor of marijuana, seemed to be 
in the car." (T 11) This is less than an enthusiastic 
assertion of a clear fact; Haycock does not actually say 
that there was a smell of marijuana inside the car, rather 
that there seemed to be. He not only says the smell was 
weak, but that it was very weak. In addition, he did not 
rely on it in forming his conclusion that there was probable 
cause to believe that drugs were in the trunk, supra p.20, 
18
 Nor borne out by subsequent events. When Haycock first 
opened the trunk he noticed two duffel bags. When, without 
moving or opening them, he " . . . bent over, smelled the duffel 
bags, there was a strong odor of marijuana in those duffel bags/' 
(T 10) not the normal odor of coffee, and not the "strong odor of 
coffee (T 10)" which he had smelled inside the car, which he and 
the prosecutor later expanded to include "these sweet coffees'7 
and "these sweet cappuccino coffees that are popular today (T 
44)." Haycock identified the smell he detected inside the car as 
the smell of the fabric softener sheets (" . . . they sure stunk" 
[T 34])in which the marijuana had been wrapped (T 34). The fact 
that he did not smell this odor when he bent over to smell the 
duffel bags when he first found them in the trunk is ample reason 
to question his entire testimony about what he smelled in the 
car. 
32 
nor did he ever say that it strengthened the conclusion he 
had already reached before he smelled anything. 
It is conceded that the smell of marijuana may 
itself provide probable cause to justify a warrantless 
search of an automobile, State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969 
(Utah App. 1992). According to the trial court, "Even the 
weak smell of marijuana, standing alone, is sufficient to 
justify a search" (R 97; Addendum, infra), but no Utah case 
was found in which the weak smell of marijuana was held, 
absent any other fact, to provide probable cause for a 
warrantless and unconsented search. Whether or not such a 
"weak plain smell" exception exists in Utah, the trial court 
in this case extends the doctrine to include a "very weak 
plain smell" that the officer was only willing to say seemed 
to be inside the car. Upon Haycock's testimony about what 
he smelled in the car, the very existence of a marijuana 
smell is seriously in question and at best tenuous. It 
should not be held adequate to establish probable cause to 
search the trunk in this case. 
Of the remaining facts the trial court listed as 
establishing probable cause for this search, some make no 
sense at all. In this category are the trial court's #6 
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(numerous keys on the ignition key ring), #11 (the fact that 
Bugyik's clothing could not conceal much of a weapon) and 
#12 (the invalid driver's license). None of these facts 
have any logical bearing on drug transport in general nor on 
the question whether there was reason to believe that 
Bugyik's trunk contained marijuana. 
The trial court's #7 (fast food wrappers inside the 
car) is also useless and irrelevant to the inquiry. Even if 
there had been testimony (which there was not) that 
Haycock's experience has shown him that drug couriers have 
fast food wrappers inside their cars, that fact is no more 
useful than the fact, for example, that drug couriers often 
drink milk. In fact, in the context of this case, the fast 
food wrappers tend to corroborate Bugyik's story that he was 
in a hurry to get to Denver. 
Similarly, Item #5 (the open road map) has no 
conceivable connection to the transport of drugs. Even 
though Haycock said that he often sees road maps in cars 
driven by drug couriers (T 17), that fact is not probative 
of the likelihood that someone with a map is a drug courier. 
Haycock's second conclusion about the map, viz., that if 
Bugyik really did have family in Denver he would not need a 
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map because he would know the way (T 17), is selective 
speculation in its pristine form. There exist myriad 
reasons for following a map, none involving crime. That 
Haycock may actually believe that the use of a road map 
increases (to any degree whatever) the likelihood of drug 
transport, and that he may act upon this and similarly 
innocuous facts which he, in his zealous effort to intercept 
drugs, quite incorrectly regards as reliable earmarks of 
drug traffic, to effect significant intrusions upon 
personal liberty, is ample reason for this Court to require 
more of him.19 
The facts listed #8 (Bugyik's claim of travel from 
Tucson to Denver because of a family emergency), #9 (Las 
Vegas Line Magazine and Day's Inn envelope) and #10 (the 
"detour" theory) are all related to Haycock's reasoning that 
Bugyik had taken a route of travel that went through Las 
Vegas and that, by implication, this route would not be 
chosen by anyone who was really responding to a family 
emergency in Denver. This speculation by Haycock requires 
19
 "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious 
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without 
understanding." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
479, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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also a completely unfounded assumption that if Bugyik's 
announced purpose were legitimate, he would (1) Know about 
the alternate route which Haycock appears to believe would 
inevitably be chosen by everyone going from Tucson to Denver 
to respond to a family emergency, (2) Choose Haycock's route 
despite that it involves travel on narrower roads which may 
be more difficult, dangerous, or tiring, and (3) have no 
legitimate interest or purpose, whether related to the 
family emergency or some ancillary reason, in taking a 
longer route. Even though the route Tucson-Las Vegas-Denver 
is longer than that which Haycock posits, there are again 
any number of innocent explanations20 why the longer route 
would be used by someone who really did have a family 
emergency in Denver.21 
The two facts listed by the trial court regarding 
the rental contract, #3 (Bugyik was not a listed driver) and 
#4 (Bugyik gave the incorrect surname of the renter) are 
admittedly a basis for suspicion that the car he was driving 
20
 State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997). 
21
 "The fact that defendants were nervous does not raise a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity {citing State v. 
Robinson, 797 P.2d 435.436), nor does the fact that they were 
proceeding in a less than direct route to their destination." 
State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652, 654 (Utah App. 1992). 
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may have been stolen, although even Haycock backed away from 
his statement that if the driver isn't authorized by the 
contract, ''It's a stolen car" (T 26). These facts, however, 
are wholly without significance as regards the transport of 
illegal drugs except insofar as they indicate the precise 
opposite of what Haycock and the trial court appear to 
believe. A forceful argument can be made for the 
proposition that somebody who is actually transporting a 
large quantity of illegal drugs along a major drug 
"corridor" in a vehicle of a type (rented) used by a 
disproportionately large segment of drug couriers22 will be 
very unlikely to be doing so in a stolen car. Although one 
may exist, counsel is aware of no case in which the orderly, 
planned interstate transport of a large quantity of illegal 
drugs over major Interstate highways known to be drug 
corridors was attempted during broad daylight in a stolen 
car with no license plates and no valid temporary 
registration sticker, or with a valid sticker that was 
22
 This may have been what Haycock had in mind when he 
talked about the use by drug couriers of rental cars, but he 
never said it. It was the prosecutor's burden to justify this 
warrantless and unconsented search of Bugyik's trunk, State v. 
Wells, supra. Even if the disproportion exists it was never 
made a part of the evidentiary record in this case. 
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nevertheless so placed on the car as to invite the claim by 
patrol officers that it was it possible to verify the 
sticker only by stopping the car for a closer look. 
Although Haycock mentioned several times (T 9, 14, 
41) that Bugyik's car had a piece of luggage in the back 
seat instead of the trunk, and although the trial court 
listed that fact (#1) (R 94) as a component of the 
conclusion that probable cause existed, it is not 
immediately apparent why this fact raises suspicion of 
criminal conduct, nor how it increased the likelihood that 
this car contained illegal drugs. Absent some specific 
rationale to the contrary, the presence of the luggage in 
the back seat is arguably consistent with Bugyik's story 
that he was hurrying to Denver because of a family 
emergency, since it is quite plausible that in his haste to 
depart, Bugyik would not have taken the time to open the 
trunk and place the luggage inside. 
As to the fact listed #5 (Bugyik's travel along a 
drug corridor in a direction consistent with transport), 
Haycock acknowledged (T 45) that when he makes a stop on 
1-70 he always has in mind the fact that it is a drug 
corridor. As such, there is nothing unusually suspicious 
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about Bugyik's presence on that highway.23 
Bugyik's inconsistent statements denying that there 
was marijuana in the trunk and that he had "been in" the 
trunk (#5 on the trial court's list), together with his 
palpable, escalating fear (#2), are all that remains to 
establish probable cause for this search. While the 
inconsistent statement about the contents of the trunk may 
have some relevance to the existence of probable cause to 
believe the trunk contained illegal drugs, and while 
Bugyik's increasing fear and anxiety may also have some 
relevance to that inquiry, they are simply not enough to 
justify the search of the trunk of the car: 
1. Haycock made repeated references to Bugyik's 
fear (T 5: looked scared), (T 8: more nervous, fear and 
nervousness started to increase, stuttering and stammering 
and having a hard time controlling himself) (T 9: people 
donft behave this way on traffic stops, more scared, more 
23
 " . . . a very large category of presumably innocent 
travelers . . . would be subject to virtually random searches 
were [we] to conclude that as little foundation as there was in 
this case could justify a seizure. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 
438, 441 (1980); see also State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1160 
(Utah App. 1997) (An innocent explanation may easily be given 
for each of the four factors relied upon by the trial court.); 
State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997) (any number 
of possible innocent explanations for defendant's behavior). 
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nervous than other people In a similar type situation), (T 
16: more frightened that people in that situation usually 
are) (T 21: he was scared) (T 22: scared, afraid) (T 31: 
increasing nervousness during the entire encounter) (T 39: 
fear, he was afraid) (T 41: the fear). 
2. Even though Haycock was thus acutely aware that 
Bugyik was more or less terrified, Haycock viewed Bugyik's 
fear not so much an indication that crime was afoot, but 
rather as a threat to Haycock's personal safety. In fact, 
when Haycock was literally invited to relate Bugyik's fear 
to an articulable suspicion that Bugyik was concealing the 
commission of a crime (possession of a stolen car or the 
transport of illegal drugs would both be logical candidates 
in the circumstances), Haycock instead related it to 
concerns for his own safety: 
Q: (DEFENSE COUNSEL)So, but what did you 
suspect based on that fear? 
A: To be careful, watch my step. 
Q: . . . what would you tell us that you 
assumed or you were suspicious was 
going on? 
A: . . . when I've dealt with people that 
wanted to hurt me, one of the first 
things that I observed about that person 
is that they were afraid of me, that they 
were . . . more scared than other people 
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in a similar traffic stop situation. 
Q: So . . . this man's fear caused you to be 
suspicious that he was going to hurt you? 
A: That he could, that I needed to be careful. 
Q: And you didn't have any other ideas in 
your head at that point about some other 
unlawful activities, you were just afraid 
for your safety? 
A: That's correct. 
3. The fear or nervousness of people stopped by 
the police is noted in the majority of reported decisions, 
and is almost universally cited by the police officers as a 
component of their suspicion of crime and, in the applicable 
case, of probable cause to conduct warrantless unconsented 
searches.24 Fear or nervousness alone is never enough to 
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 
nor to establish probable cause for a warrantless search, 
State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993), but may be 
24
 e.g., State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987); State v. Spotts, 
861 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 
(Utah App. 1993); State v. Lee, 862 P.2d 49 (Utah App. 
1992); State v, Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913 (Utah App. 1992); 
State v. Lovegren. 829 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1992); State v. 
Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Godina-
Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Munsen, 621 
P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 
(Utah App. 1990); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 
1988); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988); State 
v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1987). 
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considered along with other objective facts that are clear 
indicators of criminal activity. While the great majority 
of cases may fairly be said to discount entirely the impact 
of a defendant's nervous or fearful behavior, there is 
authority for the proposition that it might be probative of 
reasonable suspicion (and therefore, by implication, of 
probable cause) in cases where other unequivocally damning 
facts were known to the officers prior to the seizure.25 
There is in this case, however, no such other fact 
that clearly points to criminal activity, nor to the 
presence of contraband, and Bugyik's fear and nervousness is 
consistent with the common reaction of even innocent persons 
who are stopped by the police.26 
25
 See, e.g., State v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 
1993)(defendant's smoking, although consistent with an 
innocent activity, was also strongly indicative of criminal 
activity when witnessed by an officer whose experience 
indicated to her that the defendant was smoking a marijuana 
joint). 
26
 See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989)and 
State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), both discussing 
the normal anxiety or nervousness that a stop by the police 
almost universally produces. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case is a striking example of the zeal of law 
enforcement where drugs and automobiles are involved. The 
conclusion is nearly inescapable that Trooper Haycock, 
despite his denial (T 16), was acting on a hunch almost from 
the outset of the encounter with Bugyik. Haycock 
acknowledged that he had concluded that Bugyik was a drug 
courier before he ever got into the car, where he claims to 
have smelled marijuana. His testimony at the suppression 
hearing demonstrates his extraordinary selectiveness in his 
interpretation of otherwise innocent facts, a belief on his 
part that if he encounters any fact which he has previously 
seen in a drug case, he thereby has greater reason to 
suspect the transport of illegal drugs (T 45), and a belief 
that, in a particular case, a large number of otherwise 
innocent facts which he has observed in the past in drug 
transport cases, will operate synergistically to justify 
seizure and detention. The officer in this case was led to 
the drugs in Bugyik's trunk by his instinct, zeal and luck 
rather than by the specific, articulable facts pointing to 
criminal activity that the law requires. The trial court's 
denial of Bugyik's motion to suppress should be reversed. 
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ADDENDUM 
TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
FILED NOV 2 6 1997 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
THE STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
STEVEN DIETER BUGYIK, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 9717-44 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
The suppression hearing in this case was held on 
September 30, 1997• Following the hearing, counsel offered to 
submit memoranda on the legal issues. Counsel thereafter agreed 
to supplement the record by including the fabric softener sheets 
about which Trooper Richard Haycock ("Haycock") testified. The 
Court has now received memoranda from both parties. 
Initial Stop 
Defendant contends that Haycock should not have stopped 
defendant7s vehicle. Haycock's uncontradicted testimony 
established that the temporary permit sticker in the rear window 
of defendant's vehicle was not visible. Since Haycock could see 
no license plate or temporary registration sticker as he 
approached the vehicle from behind, he had a reasonable suspicion 
that defendant was driving a vehicle without registration. The 
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Court is convinced that the combination of tint, slant and 
defroster element lines in the rear window made the sticker 
invisible to Haycock. 
Since an officer is permitted to stop any vehicle when 
he observes a violation of the traffic laws, Haycock's decision 
to stop defendant's vehicle did not violate defendant's constitu-
tional rights. The Court believes that Haycock was close enough 
to the rear of the vehicle to observe the great majority of 
temporary stickers. The invisibility of this sticker resulted 
entirely from defendant's choices. The Court rejects defendant's 
suggestion that officers must be required to drive alongside 
every vehicle without license plates or a visible temporary 
sticker before effecting a traffic stop. 
Citizen-Police Encounter 
Once Haycock got out of his car and approached 
defendant on foot, he noticed the valid temporary sticker in the 
rear window of defendant's vehicle. He then did precisely what 
the law requires; he notified defendant of the reason for the 
stop, noted that his concern had been allayed, and turned to 
leave. At this point, the level two encounter ended. 
Defendant then invited Haycock to examine his rental 
agreement. The encounter then became a level one citizen-police 
encounter, just as if Haycock had walked up to defendant on the 
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street or knocked on his door. The facts of this case are 
indistinguishable from State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 
1992). While it may appear inconceivable in hindsight that 
defendant invited continued police attention, Castner is evidence 
that such events do occur. Defendant may have concluded that he 
was more likely to allay any police suspicion by appearing 
exceptionally cooperative. 
Weapons Search 
The Court agrees with defendant that, by the time 
Haycock searched the passenger compartment for weapons, the 
encounter had risen again to a level two encounter. If it were 
still a level one encounter and Haycock suspected he was in 
danger, his only remedy would be to remove himself from the 
situation. The Court must accordingly determine whether, at the 
time Haycock searched the passenger compartment, he had 
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. 
By the time Haycock searched the passenger compartment 
for weapons, he had observed the following: 
1. Defendant's luggage was in the passenger 
compartment, not the trunk. 
2. Defendant was more anxious than the average 
citizen, and his anxiety appeared to increase, rather than 
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decrease, with the passage of time. He was unable to focus on 
putting on his shoes long enough to get both of them on. 
3. Defendant was not an authorized driver of the 
vehicle, which had been rented by Dean Porter. 
4. Defendant claimed that the vehicle had been rented 
for him by Dr. Dean Allen. 
5. Defendant had an open road map on the front seat. 
6. The key ring had more keys than would be expected 
with a normal rental car. 
7. Fast food wrappers littered the interior of the 
vehicle. 
8. Defendant claimed to be travelling from Tucson to 
Denver on a family medical emergency. 
9. A magazine and a motel envelope suggested that the 
vehicle had been in Las Vegas. 
10. Travelling from Tucson to Denver by way of Las 
Vegas would be a very substantial detour, particularly for one 
responding to a family medical emergency. 
11. Defendant's clothing could not conceal much of a 
weapon. 
12. Defendant's Arizona license was not valid. 
13. Defendant was travelling on a drug courier route 
from an area that exports marijuana to an area that imports it. 
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Some of the indicators noted by Haycock are clearly 
insufficient to support reasonable suspicion and carry little 
weight even when considered with other factors. For example, an 
open road map is not uncommon for interstate travellers, nor is 
an untidy vehicle interior. However, all of the factors taken 
together reasonably justify a suspicion that 1) defendant may not 
have authorization to possess or drive the vehicle, and 2) 
defendant was not doing what he claimed to be doing. Defendant 
was also apparently driving without a valid license. Haycock was 
justified in determining that this situation warranted further 
inquiry. Defendant's agitated state and apparent deceptiveness, 
coupled with the remote location and the lack of immediate back-
up, created a reasonable concern for officer safety. Haycock was 
therefore entitled to make a protective sweep of the passenger 
compartment before proceeding with the inquiry. 
Search of the Trunk 
Haycock's subsequent search of the trunk of defendant's 
vehicle must be justified by probable cause. In addition to the 
factors set forth in the foregoing section, Haycock-knew the 
following by the time he decided to search the trunk: 
1. He smelled a weak odor of marijuana and a strong 
odor of coffee in the passenger compartment, but saw no coffee. 
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Haycock had learned that coffee odors can by used to mask 
marijuana odors.1 
2. Defendant had stated that he did not know what was 
in the trunk. 
Even the weak smell of marijuana, standing alone, is 
sufficient to justify a search. Exigent circumstances are 
evident from the lack of backup, the remote location, and the 
time required to obtain a warrant. The search of the trunk was 
accordingly proper. 
Conclusion 
The motion to suppress is denied. Defendant is ordered 
to appear before the Court with his counsel on December 17, 1997, 
at 9:30 a.m. for trial setting. 
DATED this 26th day of November, 1997. 
1
 The Court has accepted defendant's invitation to smell the fabric softener sheets that 
surrounded the marijuana to see if they smell like coffee. This judge has had little 
experience with fabric softener, and less with coffee. The judge also has a poorly trained 
olfactory sense, the performance of which is currently diminished by the viruses of the 
season. The experience was not helpful to the Court's analysis. 
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